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American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
Talasi Brooks  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut
43
 reaffirms the United States Supreme 
Court‘s holding in its 2007 decision, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.44  In 
Massachusetts, the Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority to 
regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act
45
 (CAA).
46
  In response, the EPA began 
regulatory processes aimed at Light-Duty vehicle emissions
47
 (light-duty vehicles weigh less 
than 10,000 pounds) and at emissions from ―major sources‖ (major sources are stationary 
sources that emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year of a regulated air pollutant
48
).
49
  In 
American Electric Power Company, the Court held that EPA regulation of GHGs under the CAA 
displaced the plaintiffs‘ federal common law right to a remedy.50  The Court, equally divided, 
also affirmed the Second Circuit‘s exercise of jurisdiction on the basis that at least some of the 
plaintiffs had standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
51
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Massachusetts v. EPA 
 In 1999, a group of 19 organizations filed a petition for rule-making with the EPA, asking 
the Agency to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles.
52
  The EPA refused the 
petition in 2003
53
 and the plaintiffs filed suit seeking review.
54
  In 2007, the United States 
                                                 
43
 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
44
 Mass. v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
45
 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006) (defining ―air pollutant‖). 
46
 Mass.s, 549 U.S. at 529–30. 
47
 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010). 
48
42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).  
49
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532–2533. 
50
 Id. at 2537. 
51
 Id. at 2535. 
52
 Mass., 549 U.S. at 510. 
53
 Id. at 511 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (2006)).  
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Supreme Court held that States had parens patriae standing to challenge the EPA‘s failure to 
regulate GHG emissions because climate change resulting from those emissions presented an 
―actual‖ and ―imminent‖ threat of harm to the States‘ interests.55  The Court also held that GHGs 
are ―air pollutants‖ within the language of the CAA.56  Therefore, the Court held, the CAA 
required the EPA to present a reasoned basis for its decision whether or not to regulate them.
57
 
B.  The “Cause and Contribute” and “Endangerment” Findings 
 In 2009, the EPA found that GHGs cause or contribute to air pollution.
58
  The EPA also 
found that the air pollution to which GHGs cause or contribute may endanger the public health or 
welfare.
59
  Based on these findings, the EPA began processes to regulate GHG emissions from 
new motor vehicles and from ―major stationary sources,‖60 such as power plants, under the CAA. 
C.  Procedural History of American Electric Power Company 
 In 2004, two separate groups of plaintiffs sued four private power companies as well as 
the federal Tennessee Valley Authority on the theory of public nuisance under the federal 
common law.
61
  The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and requested the district court to establish 
a cap to defendants‘ GHG emissions with annual reductions.62  The district court dismissed both 
suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions.
63
 
 The Second Circuit reversed in 2009.
64
  It held that the political question doctrine did not 
bar the suits and that the plaintiffs had Article III standing.
65
  The court also held that the CAA 
                                                                                                                                                             
54
 Id. at 514. 
55
 Id. at 521. 
56
 Id. at 528–29. 
57
 Id. at 530. 
58
 74 Fed. Reg. 66536–66546 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
59
 Id. 
60
 42 U.S.C. §  7602(j). 
61
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
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did not displace federal common law.
66
  The Second Circuit partially based its decision on the 
fact that the EPA had not begun any rule-making processes aimed at GHGs at the time of its 
decision.
67
  The defendants petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted it.
68
 
ANALYSIS 
 The Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs‘ had Article III standing.  In a four-four 
split decision, the Court determined that at least some of the plaintiffs had Article III standing, 
and thus, the suit was permissible under the Massachusetts rationale.
69
  Therefore, it affirmed the 
Second Circuit‘s exercise of jurisdiction.70  
 The Court then turned to the plaintiffs‘ federal common law right to bring a nuisance suit 
based on pollution originating in other states.  Despite the holding in Erie Railroad Company v. 
Tompkins,
71
 a federal common law has evolved around environmental issues.
72
  The Court 
emphasized that the body of law authorizing states to sue out-of-state sources whose emissions 
threaten public health or welfare has not yet been applied to questions involving climate change 
or extended to non-state entities.
73
  Regardless, the Court determined that since legislation 
authorized EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, the right to bring federal common law 
nuisance claims had been displaced.
74
 
 Citing its decision in Milwaukee II,
75
 the Court explained that once Congress has 
addressed a common law question, its action ―displaces‖ the federal common law.76  The Court 
                                                 
66
 Id. 
67
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct.. at 2534–2535. 
68
 Id. at 2535. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
72
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
73
 Id. at 2536. 
74
 Id. at 2537. 
75
 Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304 (1981)(holding that amendments to the Clean Water Act displaced the nuisance 
claim it recognized in Milwaukee I). 
76
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
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reasoned, ―it is the office of Congress . . . to prescribe national policy.‖77  The Court found the 
CAA ―speaks directly‖ to the issue of GHGs as air pollutants.78  Thus, the CAA displaced the 
federal common law system as a mechanism for GHG regulation and left no room for common 
law remedies.
79
 
 The Court then addressed accountability, summarizing the method by which EPA and 
state regulations interact to implement the CAA.
80
   The CAA provides enforcement 
mechanisms, including criminal penalties, for emitters who knowingly violate its standards.
81
  
The CAA demands accountability from the EPA, and if the EPA refuses to set emissions 
standards, the appeals procedure used in Massachusetts is available.
82
  Courts might then 
evaluate the refusal under the Administrative Procedures Act‘s ―arbitrary and capricious‖ 
standard.
83
  Furthermore, if the emissions standards are inadequate, they are subject to judicial 
review.
84
  There is no need for additional redress in nuisance law.
85
 
  Indeed, the EPA need not have to actually set regulatory standards for ―displacement‖ of 
the common law to occur.
86
  The Court stated that Congress delegated the authority to regulate 
GHG emissions from power plants to the EPA through the CAA.
87
  The avenues for judicial 
review existing within the CAA and administrative law are more appropriate than the federal 
common law for resolving disputes.
88
   The Court explained the agency is better equipped than 
                                                 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. at 2537–2538. 
80
 Id. at 2538. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. 
83
 Id. at 2539. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at 2537–2538. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. at 2538. 
88
 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539–2540. 
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individual federal courts to set emission standards for GHGs.
89
  The Court left the availability of 
state law nuisance claims open for consideration on remand.
90
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 American Electric Power Company is significant because it eliminates potential for 
public nuisance claims founded in the federal common law against GHG emitters.  The divided 
opinion on the Article III standing issue is also notable because it illustrates that standing in 
climate change suits may be tenuous. 
 While the American Electric Power Company and Massachusetts decisions provide 
grounds for regulating GHG emissions, they do not replace the need for climate legislation.  The 
CAA is an unwieldy tool for addressing GHG emissions and climate change because it was 
designed to address air pollutants whose effects are primarily localized.  Precisely-tailored 
legislation would be better suited to regulating GHGs and their global effects. 
  
                                                 
89
 Id. at 2540. 
90
 Id. at 2540–2541. 
